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Abstract 
This paper examines the reforms to New Zealand's misuse of market power 
provision brought about by the Commerce Amendment Act 2001. The issues 
that led to the reform are explored including the dissatisfaction with the courts' 
prior application of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986, the public outcry 
triggered by the difficulties in establishing competition in the electricity and 
telecommunications industries, and the competition policies of the Labour-
Alliance Coalition Government. The amendments themselves are then examined 
before the reasons why the Government opted for the reforms it did are 
discussed. The paper concludes that little significant change to section 36 has 
resulted, and that the reforms have failed to bring about the certainty and 
strengthening of the Jaws against the misuse of market power intended and 
promised. The primary reason put forward for this is the inability or 
unwillingness of the Coalition Government to take a clear position on the 
fundamental purpose of our competition laws. 
Statement on word length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page and footnotes) compnses 
approximately 15,800 words. 
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I 
I INTRODUCTION 
In 2001 the Labour-Alliance Coalition Government pass
ed the Commerce 
Amendment Act in a move designed to strengthen ew 
Zealand's competition 
laws. One of the key refom1s made was to the mis
use of market power 
prohibition embodied in section 36 of the Act. This pap
er outlines the context 
and substance of the changes and asserts that there 
has in fact been no 
significant reform. It also examines the aspirations o
f the Government in 
passing the amending legislation and the beliefs underpin
ning those aspirations, 
in an attempt to understand how and why a golden oppo
rtunity to revitalise an 
ailing section of our competition Jaw was seemingly passe
d up. 
Before doing so, it is helpful to establish some basic p
rinciples regarding the 
prohibition of the misuse of market power, and the rea
sons why a provision 
such as section 36 is considered necessary in the regulatio
n of our markets. 
II THE DOMINANT POSITION PARADIGM 
Monopolists and dominant finns that face little or no co
mpetition are typically 
considered to indulge in such practices as inefficient or li
mited production, lack 
of innovation and the extortion of monopolistic prices 
from consumers. Such 
firms have every incentive to ensure the continuation of
 that state of affairs by 
deteITing or restricting the development of meaningfu
l competition in the 
markets in which they operate. Their dominance in the m
arket often means that 
without some form of intervention, they will be success
ful in preserving their 
privileged position. 
While the need to regulate the behaviour of firms that 
dominate their market 
sector is a fundamental concern of competition Jaw, there are diverg
ent beliefs 
as to why such control is needed. Two principal schools
 of thought behind the 
prohibition of misuse of market power are evident: thos
e that see the primary 
reason for the prohibition as based on principles of soci
al policy and fairness, 
and those that ground competition Jaw and the contro
l of dominant firms' 
behaviour in the promotion of economic efficiency. 
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A Social Principles of Competition Law 
Social concerns associated with the regulation of dominant fim1's behaviour and 
the promotion of the competitive process have typically been associated with 
the 'Traditional', 'Populist' and Harvard schools of competition law. These 
schools display a policy preference for diversity and opportunity for the 
unestablished, founded upon political principles reflecting a vision of society, 
and a vision of the individual's participation in the economic enterprise.' 
Typically these schools evince an underlying distrust of big business and 
"concern for consumers; concern for the ' little man'; interest in access, diversity 
and pluralism; and condemnation of coercion and exploitation."
2 
While noting that increased competition leads to increased economic 
efficiencies, these schools draw a link between high concentrations of market 
power, diminished competition, and negative impacts on consumer wellbeing. 
Fewer competitors and low competitive pressures in a market are believed to 
result in less choice and higher prices for consumers. Key to the promotion of 
competition is the protection of small business, illustrated by Judge Learned 
Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America:3 
Throughout the history of the antitrust laws it has been constantly assumed that one of 
their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve for its own sake and in spite of possible 
cost, an organization of industry in small units .... 
For these reasons, based more on notions of equity than efficiency, firms 
dominant in a market should be constrained to act in a manner that does not 
hinder the ability of smaller firms to compete in that or another market. To this 
end dominant firms have a special responsibility not borne by smaller fim1s. In 
the words of Scalia J in Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc 
(Eastman Kodak): 4 
1 Eleanor M Fox and Lawrence A Sullivan, "Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where 
Are We Corning From? Where Are We Going?" ( 1987) 72 YUL Rev 936, 942; see also 
Lawrence A Sullivan "The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints" (1987) Cal 
L Rev 835, 841 pronouncing a positive relationship between an economy in which many have 
a personal stake and degree of control and democratic and liberal polity. 
2 Eleanor M Fox "The Battle For The Soul of Antitrust" ( 1987) Cal L Rev 917. 
3 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (1945) 148 F 2d 416,429 (2d Cir). 
4 Eastman Kodak Co v image Technical Services Inc ( 1992) 504 US 451 , 488. 
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Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his act1v1t1es are examined 
tlu·ough a special lens: Behaviour that might otherwise not be of concern to antitrust laws 
- or that might even be viewed as procompetitive - can take on exclusionary 
connotations when practiced by a monopolist 
In the United States, the values of the Harvard School of competition law were 
largely discredited during the rise of the Chicago School, however these values 
have resurfaced in the thinking of the 'New Coalition' 5 and also find expression 
in the competition laws of the European Union.6 The preamble to the Treaty of 
Rome itself expresses values of social policy, fair competition and the 
protection of small and medium sized firms. 7 
B Economic Principles: The Promotion of Efficiency 
While the promotion of efficiency had generally been associated with 
competition law, it became its almost singular focus in the United States 
following the rise to prominence of the Chicago school of competition law. The 
Chicago school views the primary objective of competition law as maximising 
consumer welfare8 through efficiency in the use and allocation of resources. 
Asserting that the competitive forces of the market punish inefficiency faster 
and better than the machinery of law9 the Chicago School argues for minimal 
legislative control over markets. The law it is argued should only intervene in 
the market to reprehend inefficient behaviour. 10 
5 See generally Fox, above. 
6 See Michelin NV v EC Commission [ 1985] CMLR 282, 326: " [a firm in a dominant position] 
has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted 
competition ... " 
7 Valentine Korah An fntroducto,y Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (6ed, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 1997) 76. 
8 See generally Robert Bork The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy At War With ftse/f(Basic Books, 
ew York, 1978) 90-117: consumer welfare is defined as the increase of aggregate wealth or 
the sum of producer and consumer welfare, on the premise that if producers make more 
money, consumers benefit because producers will invest in things that consumers want. Thus 
if consumers lose, but producers benefit more than consumers lose, consumer welfare has been 
increased. 
9 Frank H Easterbrook "The Limits of Antitrust" ( I 984) 63 Tex L Rev 1, 24. 
10 Easterbrook, above, 23. 
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While the Chicago school of competition law has attracted its share of criticism 
in recent times, 11 its emphasis on economic analysis and the promotion of 
efficiency, with a greater emphasis on innovative or dynamic efficiency, 12 
remain popular principles of competition law. 13 
Those who view efficiency as the core concern of competition law claim that 
dominant or monopolistic finns that do not face competition from other efficient 
firms should only be subject to regulatory intervention if they operate 
inefficiently or suppress innovation. 14 The market is considered able in most 
instances to discipline such inefficient behaviour through the responses of 
efficient competitors, both actual and potential. Competitors usmg new 
technologies or more efficient production methods can compete on product 
quality and price with the incumbent dominant finn, thereby forcing the 
incumbent to operate more efficiently themselves, or face a reduction in their 
market share and profits. Consumers then benefit through improved product, 
greater product choice and lower prices. It is only in situations where for various 
reasons competition cannot be expected to develop in a particular market that a 
monopolist's attempts to protect their inefficient operation should become 
subject to the sanction of law. 
Notions of the protection of less efficient small businesses are rejected by the 
Chicago School and its subsequent variants. The classic judicial expression of 
this principle is found in the words of Posner J in Olympia Equipment Leasing v 
Western Union Telegraph Co (Olympia): 15 
... the lawful monopolist should be free to compete like everyone else; otherwise the 
antitrust laws would be holding an umbrella over inefficient competitors. "A Monopolist, 
no less than any other competitor, is permitted and indeed encouraged to compete 
aggressively on the merits .. . " 
11 
See generally H Hovenkamp "Antitrust Policy After Chicago" (1985) 84 Mich L Rev, 213. 12 See Joseph F Brodley "The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare and 
Teclmological Progress" ( 1987) 7 YUL Rev 1027, I 028. 
13 See Phillip Areeda and Donald F Turner Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles 
and Their Application (Little Brown and Co, Boston, 1978) vol 1, 7-20. 14 See Bork, above, 193. 
15 Olympia Equipment Leasing v Western Union Telegraph Co. (1988) 797 F 2d 370, 375. 
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III POLICING THE MISUSE OF MARKET POWER UNDER THE 
COMMERCE ACT 1986 
In the years since the Commerce Act was enacted in 1986, firms dominant in 
New Zealand markets have been subject to minimal government intervention in 
their markets, a regime commonly referred to as 'light-handed regulation'. 
Government intervention was limited to the generic prohibitions of the 
Commerce Act and the threat of further regulation should it be required. This 
regime was predicated on the belief that competition, not government, is the 
best market regulator, but that in circumstances where it is demonstrated that 
competition in a market is unable to correct undesirable behaviour, government 
intervention may be necessary. 
Under the light-handed regime, section 36 of the Commerce Act was relied 
upon to prevent firms from abusing their dominant market position to prevent 
the development of competition. As originally enacted the provision stated: 
No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for 
the purpose of: 
(a) restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct 
in that or in any other market; or 
(c) eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
The prohibition was based on that contained in Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome 
and took its definition of dominance as the ability to operate largely 
independently of one's competitors from the seminal Re Continental Can Co 
Inc and Europemballage Inc (Continental Can/ 6 decision. However to many 
observers, the protection afforded by section 36 was eroded by two high profile 
cases during the 1990s. These cases together were widely regarded as removing 
16 Re Continental Can Co Inc and Europemballage Inc [1972] CMLR, DI 1, para 11.3. 
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the application of the prohibition to all but a handful of firms and giving even 
those firms the ability to act in a manner that seemed anti-competitive. 17 
A The First Signs of Discontent: the Telecom Cases 
The first case was that of Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v 
Commerce Commission (AMPS-A}' 8 in which the Court of Appeal determined 
the meaning of dominance under the section 36 prohibition. Instead of basing its 
definition on the economic principles envisaged, the court instead relied on a 
dictionary definition and equated dominance with notions of "a prevailing, 
commanding, ascendant, governing, primary, principal or leading influence." 19 
This appeared to necessitate the ability to singularly control the market, an 
ability that few firms other than monopolies possessed. In the words of Ross 
Paterson, the Court of Appeal decision "rejected the fundamental principles 
upon which the New Zealand jurisprudence had been based, and discredited the 
economic framework upon which the test for dominance had been built." 20 
The second case, that of Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Clear 
Communications (Telecom v Clear/' saw the Privy Council cite with approval 
the quote of Posner J in Olympia22 and pronounce the test for whether a firm 
had used its dominant position in the following terms:23 
It cannot be said that a person in a dominant market position 'uses' that position for the 
purposes of section 36 [if] he acts in a way which a person not in a dominant position but 
otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted. 
17 
See Ross H Patterson "How the Chicago School Hijacked New Zealand Competition Law and 
Policy" (1996) 17 NZULR 160 for a discussion of how judicial interpretation of section 36 
turned from its EU-derivations to adopt the efficiency-oriented values of the Chicago schoo l. 
18 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Co111 111erce Commission ( 1992) 3 NZLR 429 
(CA). 
19 Telecom v Commerce Commission, above, 434 per Cooke P; see also 442 per Richardon J. 
20 Ross H Patterson "The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in ew Zealand Competition 
Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" ( I 993) 15 ZULR 265. 
21 Telecom Co,poration of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications [1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC). 
22 Telecom v Clear, above, 402. 
23 Telecom v Clear, above, 403. 
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In its application of this counterfactual test, the Privy Council overruled the 
Court of Appeal and stated that by adopting a pricing policy for network 
interconnection that included opportunity costs, Telecom was not using its 
dominant position for the purposes of section 36.24 These opportunity costs 
could include the monopoly rents that Telecom was assumed to be earning in 
the current provision of its services, although Clear had not actually established 
the existence of these monopoly rents. The decision seemingly allowed 
Telecom, the dominant firn1, to act in a manner that was contrary to the 
promotion of competition, and held to an assumption that a monopolist should 
be allowed to compete as aggressively as firms that do not have that degree of 
economic strength, 25 rather than take a special responsibility for its actions. 
B Impetus for Reform Grows: The Problem of Electricity and 
Telecommtmications 
The longstanding calls for a revamp of New Zealand's competition laws gained 
impetus as the behaviour of the formerly State-owned public utilities started to 
impact on the purse strings of the New Zealand public. Telecommunications and 
electricity provide two of the country's most obvious examples of industries in 
which the market power is concentrated in the hands of one or two big players. 
They both involve natural monopoly elements, in the forn1 of networks, 
established and developed by the State, which are uneconomic for any new 
market entrants to duplicate. The incumbent network owner is consequently in a 
position of dominance in the market. For competition to develop in these 
industries, new entrants need access to the network to compete in an upstream 
or downstream market. Where the incumbent network owner also competes in 
those markets, they have an incentive to delay access to the network, or make 
access available on unreasonable terms and conditions, and thereby deter or 
restrict the development of competition. 
24 Arguably this finding was simply one of appropriate statutory interpretation, however the 
merits of the case are not the subject of this paper, what is important is the perception that 
arose as a result. 
25 Ross H Patterson "How the Chicago School Hijacked New Zealand Competition Law and 
Policy" above, 187. 
In the lead up to the 1999 general election, the seemmg inability of New 
Zealand's light-handed regulatory regime to modify the behaviour of monopoly 
or dominant firms was highlighted by the troubled 1998 electricity reforms of 
the National-led Government and the seemingly unassailable position of 
Telecom in the New Zealand telecommunications market. 
C The Electricity Crisis 
In 1998, the then National Government instituted reforms of New Zealand's 
electricity sector through Hon M Bradford's Electricity Industry Reform Bill. 
The Bill was an attempt to introduce competition into electricity generation and 
overcome the anti-competitive energy trading of the monopoly electricity lines 
business. The Bill sought to achieve this by structural means through splitting 
the State generator Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ) into three 
generators who it was envisaged would compete with each other, Contact 
Energy and smaller private generators. The Bill would also force local power 
companies to split into separate lines and energy businesses and divest 
themselves of one of these operating anns. 
On the enactment of his Bill on 3 July 1998, Hon M Bradford promised that his 
reforms would ensure "genuine sustainable competition"26 throughout the 
electricity sector, meaning that lower prices were just around the corner for both 
households and business. The Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 was 
supported through the House by the centre-left Labour party while in 
opposition, although they reserved the right to review the situation and 
reassemble ECNZ should it prove warranted. The champion of the political left, 
the Alliance party, fearful of the future privatisation and likely foreign 
ownership of another of New Zealand's essential services, opposed the reforms 
and advocated that ECNZ be kept together and retained in State ownership.27 
The split of ECNZ under the Electricity Industry Reform Act took place on 
April 1 1999. As early as April 20, significant price increases were felt in and 
26 "Electricity change Bill passed" (4 July 1998) Th e Dominion Wellington I. 
27 "Alliance Plans to Reverse Split" (9 November 1999) The Dominion Wellington 5. 
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around the New Zealand's main centres. 28 Humbled by the failure of his reforms 
to bring lower prices to the New Zealand public, Hon M Bradford promised 
intervention in the form of price and profit controls on the electricity lines 
businesses. Legislation in the shape of the Commerce Amendment (Controlled 
Goods) Bill was hurriedly drafted to allow the Commerce Commission to 
impose price and revenue control on the lines businesses. However, in an 
election year and with a tenuous hold on government,29 Hon M Bradford and 
National faced a difficult road to supplement his original reforms and bring the 
lower prices promised. National's usual political ally, the Association of 
Consumers and Taxpayers (ACT), refused to support Hon M Bradford's latest 
electricity reforms due to their fundamental opposition to government regulation 
of industry. To gain passage of his Bill, Hon M Bradford curried the favour of 
Labour and New Zealand First, and gained their support through the first and 
second readings in the House. However both parties withdrew their support 
before the Bill's final reading on the grounds that it was hastily drafted and did 
not impose any control on electricity retailers, who were suspected of shared 
responsibility for the increased electricity prices. 
Labour's decision to withdraw its support for the Bill was purely political move. 
By delaying potentially immediate consumer relief the National Government's 
electricity crisis deepened as the general election loomed. After flexing its 
political muscle in stalling the Government's attempted reforms, a confident 
Labour promised that as the incoming government it would appoint an inquiry 
into the industry and introduce regulation only after its findings had been 
considered. Labour also sought guarantees from the electricity industry that no 
further price increases would occur prior to the impending election. In so doing, 
Labour were able to justify its opposition to seemingly needed reforms, while 
ensuring that public dissatisfaction with National's regulation of the 
monopolistic powers of the electricity generators carried through to the election. 
28 Marta Steeman "Transalta Prices Go Up Today Despite Reforms" (20 April 1999) Th e 
Dominion Wellington 3. The average household price for electricity rose by 10 percent in 
Wellington, 10.5 per cent in Auckland and 13 per cent in Christchurch. 
29 The ational-led Government's slender Parliamentary majority was secured by virtue of a 
collection of disaffected former ew Zealand First and Alliance MPs. 
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D Telecommunications and the Unassailable Position of Telecom 
Following its privatisation in 1989, Telecom had continued to enJoy a near 
monopoly over local residential and business services through its ownership of 
the Public Service Telecommunications Network (PSTN). The 
Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand joined with new 
market entrants in decrying the difficulties in setting up meaningful competition 
as a curb to Telecom's continued dominance. 30 New Zealand's light-handed 
regulatory regime seemingly allowed Telecom to make it more difficult for 
challengers to assail its envious position. Clear Communications, the first 
meaningful market entrant had been confronted with years of highly publicised 
litigation over its negotiations with Telecom for access to the PSTN. This 
culminated in the Privy Council decision in 1994 which allowed Telecom to 
charge its rival an access fee that incorporated the monopoly rents it would 
necessarily forego by allowing Clear access to its network. 31 Yet despite this the 
then Minister of Communications unsympathetically dismissed the complaints 
as a 'policy of shared misery', on the basis that the new entrants had "whinged 
every day since they first got here", 32 a view not widely held by either the public 
or officials. 
Public perception worsened, though with less foundation, when in 1998 
Telecom offered a rebate to its Hutt Valley customers in response to the lower 
rental prices charged by another new entrant, Saturn. The move drew wide 
public outcry but no official censure. The Ministry of Commerce stated publicly 
that there was no policy requiring a dominant firm to reduce prices to all 
customers when facing competition in a limited po11ion of the market. 33 The 
Commerce Commission, New Zealand's competition watchdog, took no action 
in response to Telecom's actions, finding that the prices charged by Telecom 
30 "Minnows Still Trailing in Telecom's Mighty Wake" (8 January 1998) The New Zealand 
Herald Auckland 9. 
31 Although in the face ofgovernn1ent pressure, the Baumol-Willig pricing model approved by 
the Privy Council was never actually imposed by Telecom for interconnection to the PSTN. 
32 "Williamson Counter-attacks Telecommunications Critics" (4 August 1997) New Zealand 
Infotech Weekly Wellington 2. 
33 "Telecom's Hutt Pricing ot Unorthodox" (13 July 1998) The Dominion Wellington 5. 
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were not below the incremental cost of providing local access services to its 
Hutt Valley customers. 
The Jack of meaningful competition, complemented by a readiness to push the 
letter of its public service obligations embodied in the government's kiwi share, 
fed the perception that Telecom had abused its position to deter competition so 
as to continue achieving high profits at the expense of the consumer. In the 
years since its privatisation, Telecom had achieved super-profits while domestic 
rental prices had been increased by the rate of inflation, the maximum 
permissible level. This situation the leader of the Alliance referred to as a 
"licence to print money for nearly 10 years."34 
IV EARLY ATTEMPTS AT REFORM 
A The Commerce Amendment (Control of A Dominant Position) Bill 1999 
Early in 1999 the Alliance had sought to redress the imbalance of New 
Zealand's competition laws towards dominant players with the introduction of 
the Commerce Amendment (Control of a Dominant Position) Bill. The Bill, 
introduced by L Harre, MP proposed the addition to section 36 of the phrase "in 
a manner that has, or is likely to have the effect of substantially lessening, 
competition in a market" to the existing prohibition of a firm taking advantage 
of its dominant position in a market for a proscribed purpose. This would give 
the consequences of a fim1's conduct on the level of competition in the market 
the same relevance as the firm's purpose, when detennining whether the 
conduct was anti-competitive. 
In introducing the Bill's second reading L Harre, MP railed against the 
ineffectiveness of the current statute and in particular the need for the anti-
competitive purpose of the dominant firm to be proved: 35 
34 Hon J Anderton, MP ( 1 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17231. 
35 Hon L Hane, MP (31 March 1999) 576 ZPD 15813. 
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Why should motive need to be proved? If a reduction in competition is incidental to the 
use of a dominant position for some other purpose, then should the behaviour be allowed 
to continue? We say not. 
Proof of purpose was also considered difficult for those alleging a breach of 
section 36 to establish, as any subjective evidence of the intended purpose was 
in the hands of the alleged contravenor and could be easily concealed or 
destroyed. Although the proposed amendment retained the element of purpose, 
the Bill also proposed that the courts be able to infer a dominant firm's purpose 
from the facts and circumstances of the case. A similar provision had been 
provided for under section 46 of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1976 to 
overcome the apparently onerous evidential burden of establishing a dominant 
firm's purpose. 
While the Bill had the support of the Labour Party, the National-led 
Government dismissed the legislation as piecemeal as it addressed only one 
aspect of the Act, and the Bill was discharged by a two-vote majority. 
B National's Commerce Amendment Bill 
Soon after the public rancour that accompanied his electricity refonns, and in 
conjunction with his attempts to bring price control to the lines businesses, Hon 
M Bradford had on 1 June 1999 introduced his own Commerce Amendment 
Bill. This Bill purported to address some of the stated weaknesses of the 
existing statute by strengthening its enforcement regime and increasing the 
penalties available for a breach of the act so that "large businesses could no 
longer consider these simply as a cost of doing business."36 The current 
penalties were supplemented by an alternative maximum penalty of up to three 
times the value of the illegal gain achieved, or ten per cent of the annual 
turnover of the transgressing film. 
The Bill was initially silent on the provision in relation to misuses of market 
power by dominant firms. Possibly in the face of Opposition criticism on 
precisely that point and the growing public outrage regarding the actions of the 
15 
dominant electricity and telecommunications players, Hon M Bradford added 
three amendments to section 36 into the Supplementary Order Paper (no. 203) 
passed to the Select Committee. The first amendment proposed a further 
definition to the term 'dominant position' by explaining it as the position to 
exercise a 'high degree of market power.' 37 This was hailed as a return to the 
level of power previously understood to attract section 36 attention "where there 
is a large discretion to depart from competitive behaviour" as stated by the High 
Court in its consideration of the AMPS-A case. 38 
The next amendment expressly provided that 'use' in relation to a person's 
dominant position in a market be treated only as the causal connection between 
the dominant position and the stated proscribed purposes. 39 Interestingly the last 
amendment to section 36 proposed by Hon M Bradford adopted the inference of 
evidence with regard to purpose provision employed in Australia and earlier 
advocated by the Alliance's proposed reforms. 
Time, however, had run out for Hon M Bradford's reforms. With the election 
looming ever closer, his proposed amendments were stranded at the select 
committee stage, to be carried over to the new government's term. As it so 
turned out, the new government would be that of the Labour-Alliance Coalition, 
two parties that had as cornerstones of their respective commercial policies, the 
revamp of the country' s competition laws. 
V THE COMPETITION POLICIES OF THE COALITION PARTNERS 
A The Alliance 
The Alliance's competition policy was very much founded upon the belief that 
New Zealand's light-handed regulation simply did not work. The present laws 
were not enough to modify the behaviour of firn1s dominant in their market 
36 Hon D Carter ( 1 June 1999) 578 NZPD 17229. 
37 Commerce Amendment Bill 1999, S0203 , cl 2A(l). 
38 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 473 , 509 
(HC). 
39 Commerce Amendment Bill 1999, S0203 cl 4A (lA)(a). 
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sectors. This was evidenced by the fact that the "excess profits of Telecom and 
its monopoly control were at least as strong as the day it was sold."4° Fair 
competition was essential if New Zealand's economy was to be successful both 
domestically and internationally. This notion of fair competition was stated to 
be a situation in which there were "no wide disparities of power between patiies 
to commercial transactions and all parties come to transactions with the desire to 
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes."41 This idealistic expression of 
competition reflected not only the idea of competition law as providing a level 
playing field, but as a means to actually level the market power of the players. 
The Alliance saw the primary impediment to fair competition to be the anti-
competitive behaviour of large companies that dominated their market sector 
and made it difficult for competitors to compete in that market. These large 
corporations, unconstrained by competition or potent regulation were thus able 
to plunder the pockets of New Zealand consumers. Increased competition 
combined with tighter regulation would ensure a more even distribution of 
market power across the market participants. This thinly veiled threat to the 
actions of Telecom was made more obvious in headlines that accompanied their 
policy in the run in to the election such as "Alliance leash for Spot" and 
"Alliance Guns for Telecom" and the promise that "Telecom would have one 
Y2K problem after the election - fair competition."42 
The Alliance sought to eradicate anti-competitive behaviour through a variety of 
measures. 
First, section 36 of the Commerce Act would be redrafted "to ensure that the 
intent of the Act is adhered to and not bogged down in endless litigation as at 
present."43 The fundamental driver behind this was the need to make the 
statutory prohibition more easily enforceable and remove lengthy litigation as 
another weapon in the arsenal of dominant firms when responding to challenges 
40 The Alliance Party "Competition Policy" <http: //www.alliance.org.nz/info.php3?Type=Policy 
&ID=989> (last accessed 29 June 2002). 
41 The Alliance Party, above. 
42 Peter Luke "Alliance Leash for Spot" (24 November 1999) Th e Press Christchurch 2. 
43 The Alliance Party, above. 
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from their competitors. This would be achieved through clarification of the 
definitions of dominant position and use of that position, and by the introduction 
of an 'effects test' to focus attention on the consequences of the firm's conduct 
on competition in the market. 
Further to the stated need to redraft section 36, the Alliance's policy envisaged a 
need for specific regulation for industries in which competition could not be 
expected to regulate dominant firms in the foreseeable future. Wide-ranging 
regulation of the telecommunications sector was proposed. 44 
As a final tonic, increased penalties for breaches of the Commerce Act were 
also advocated, such that the commercial gains of anti-competitive behaviour 
were outweighed by the sanctions able to be enforced for such a breach. 
At the forefront of the Alliance's policy was the idea of competition law as a 
tool of social policy, a means by which protection of the vulnerable could be 
achieved and imbalances of power could be addressed. The market, and 
particularly big business, could not be trusted to give any significant weight to 
the consideration of the interests of the general public where profit was at stake. 
Telecom had supposedly proved this time and again. The Alliance policy also 
hinted at a belief in a wider function of competition law as it talked of 
empowering the Commerce Commission to 'take account of a wider range of 
social and environmental factors in establishing whether or not the public good 
is being served when it comes to identifying anti-competitive behaviour."45 This 
sought to move the determination of 'public benefit' away from the efficiency-
dominated measurement applied by the Commerce Commission under the 
current legislation,46 and acknowledge explicitly that other interests are also 
represented by 'public benefit'. Their policy seemed largely to ignore economic 
considerations, despite their assertion that fair competition was essential to the 
success of the New Zealand economy. Their desire to address imbalances m 
44 This included establishment of statutory principles governing interconnection to the PST 
and pricing of monopoly services, comprehensive disclosure regime, price ceilings and 
reduction targets along with a possible revision of the kiwi share obligation. 
45 The Alliance Party, above. 
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market power to create a more equitable market place is questionable from an 
economic perspective. In many cases corporations grow in stature through 
efficiencies gained through economies of scale. To punish rather than reward 
those firms is counter-productive from the viewpoint of economic advancement. 
B A Clear Policy Plank: Labour's Competition Policy 
Labour's competition policy was more equivocal in relation to the current light-
handed regulatory approach, acknowledging both its benefits and shortcomings 
in advancing the interests of New Zealanders through the promotion of 
competition. Competition, it was reiterated, was directly beneficial to consumers 
by encouraging productivity, innovation and lower prices. Competition was also 
pivotal to Labour's export-led growth strategy as a dynamic, competitive and 
efficiently operating domestic market would also enhance the country's ability 
to compete internationally and export successfully. But Labour's primary focus 
in the promotion of competition was as a means to enhance consumer welfare 
and it proposed first and foremost that appropriate words be added to the long 
title of the Act, and a relevant purpose clause incorporated to reflect this focus. 
In seeking reform of the Commerce Act, Labour's policy noted the changing 
nature of New Zealand economy and an mcrease in large corporations 
dominating their market sector through foreign investment and the 
corporatisation and privatisation of formerly State-owned operations. 
Competition law, it was stated, had not kept pace with these changes meaning 
that the power of these large corporations could be used against the interests of 
consumers and to stymie the benefits of competition:47 
Labour believes that firms which have significant market power should not be able to 
misuse that power. Only when the misuse of power has been addressed can the potential 
advantage of competition be realised. It is therefore the focus of this policy to promote 
competition where appropriate by cracking down on unfair and anti-competitive 
behaviour. 
46 See generally Commerce Act 1986, s 3A and Commerce Commission Guidelines to the 
Analysis of Public Benefits and Detriments (Wellington, 1994). 
47 Labour Party "Improving Competition Policy" ( 10 August 1999) <http: //www.labour.org.nz 
/Frame-Search.html> (last accessed 29 June 2002). 
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Labour planned to ensure that finns would not be able to take unfair advantage 
of dominant positions, and that the effects of their actions on consumers be 
given weight in law. This focus on the effects of firms ' actions on consumers, 
suggested a mirroring of the Alliance ' s position in relation to the introduction of 
an effects test into section 36. Labour had earlier supported the Commerce 
Amendment (Control of a Dominant Position) Bill which sought to introduce 
such a test, and in a 1998 discussion paper Labour had explicitly promoted the 
replacement of the purpose limb of section 36 with an effects test. 
Labour's competition policy in 1999 however relied heavily on the Ministry of 
Commerce discussion paper Review of the Competition Thresholds in the 
Commerce Act 1986 and Related Jssues48 and the submissions made in response 
to that paper. The paper considered the issue of anti-competitive effects but 
deemed an effects test to be inappropriate. The reasons given were the risk that 
legitimate competitive activity would be deterred by the expanded scope of 
activity brought within the reach of section 36, and because of the uncertainty 
involved in postulating hypothetical scenarios to compare the effect of the 
conduct against what might have happened without the particular conduct. 49 
Labour were taken with the preferred option of the Ministry of Commerce ' s 
paper, that of revamping New Zealand ' s competition laws by aligning them 
with those of our closest neighbour and trading partner, Australia. Anti-
competitive behaviour by dominant firms would be addressed through the 
alignment of the prohibition in section 36 of the Commerce Act with its 
Australian counterpart, section 46 of the Trade Practices Act 197 4. This would 
be achieved by the replacing dominant position with the term 'substantial 
degree of market power', replacing 'use' with 'take advantage of and by adding 
a clause, equivalent to that of section 46( 4) of the Australian legislation to 
clarify the interpretation of purpose. Despite dropping its call for an effects test, 
Labour still considered that: 50 
48 Ministry of Commerce Review of the Competition Thresholds in the Commerce Act I 986 and 
Related Issues (Wellington, 1999). 
49 Ministry of Commerce, above, 24 . 
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... the effect of anti-competitive behaviour should be taken into consideration in 
determining whether the behaviour is acceptable or not. Some analysis of the Australian 
legislation suggests that their interpretation of 'purpose' allows this to happen. Labour 
will expect the select committee considering the Commerce Act amendments, to fully 
consider this issue and if necessary recommend further amendments to ensure that the 
effects are able to be considered. 
The analysis of the Australian legislation is not expanded upon in Labour's 
competition policy, and indeed appears suspect given that there have been 
repeated calls across the Tasman for an effects test to be given express 
recognition in the Trade Practices Act. Further, it appears strange that an 
opposition party would rely so heavily on a departmental paper for a policy that 
ignored a fundamental aspect of its previous policy position. A likely motive for 
this was the desire to gain credibility with the business community and dispel 
their fears of a highly interventionist and socialist-leaning government. Labour 
could be seen to be addressing a problematic area of law without adopting a 
measure considered abhorrent by big business. By stating that the matter would 
be given further consideration at the select committee stage, Labour were 
effectively fence-sitting on the issue, and avoiding criticism from either those 
that pursued an effects test, or those who were diametrically opposed to it. 
Indeed Labour's entire competition policy appeared slightly double-edged, the 
rhetoric suggesting a shift in direction for New Zealand's competition laws but 
the substance of their proposals appearing to lack the same commitment to 
change. 
Several benefits in ham1onising New Zealand's competition laws with those of 
Australia were touted in Labour's competition policy. It was in the spirit of the 
our Closer Economic Relations agreement in which unifonnity of competition 
laws was seen as advantageous to the ultimate goal of free trade between the 
two countries. 51 It would reduce transaction costs for finns dealing in the trans-
Tasman market and spread the cost of testing the limits of competition policy 
across market participants in both countries. It would also increase the level of 
certainty as to the court's interpretation of the legislation as they could apply 
precedent Australian case law to New Zealand's markets. 
50 Labour Party, above. 
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Like the Alliance party, and for that matter National before them, Labour also 
proposed that penalties for breaches of the Act be increased to eliminate the 
possibility that a firm could consider prosecution to be an acceptable cost of 
doing business. Labour also anticipated the necessity of specific regulation of 
some industries, 'particularly those with a natural monopoly element'. 
Having announced its intention to commission a review of the electricity lines 
business, Labour would also initiate a review of the telecommunications 
industry and indeed stated that it would review all existing industry specific 
regulations to ensure their continued effectiveness. The possibility of generic 
network utilities legislation was suggested. Labour signaled too that should an 
industry be faced with monopolistic practices, as government it would be 
prepared to invoke the price control provisions of the Commerce Act to protect 
the interests of consumers, something previous governments had been extremely 
reluctant to do. 
VI THE COMMERCE AMENDMENT ACT 2001 
Upon attaining power, the Labour-Alliance Coalition Government initiated their 
promised reviews of the telecommunications and electricity industries. They 
also set about the long and convoluted process of enacting their reforms to the 
Commerce Act. 
The Supplementary Order Paper of the National Government (No. 203) lapsed 
and was replaced in August of 2000 by a second Supplementary Order Paper 
(No. 37) that proposed the reforms embodied in the Labour's pre-election 
policy. A Commerce Amendment Bill, which omitted the proposed amendments 
to section 36, was then introduced to the House. This was then reformulated and 
returned to the Commerce Committee. 
The Commerce Amendment Bill (No.2) was eventually presented to the House 
and became law on 31 July 2001. The Act introduced amendments to the key 
5 1 Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement 1984, art 1. 
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provisions of section 36, and of section 47 that deals with business acquisitions. 
The price control provisions, enforcement and penalties regimes were amended, 
while a consumer welfare-focused purpose statement was also added to the Act. 
Interestingly, specific price control provisions applicable to the electricity lines 
businesses were also introduced as part of the amendment to the Act. These 
provisions mimicked the provisions that Hon M Bradford had earlier tried and 
failed to introduce prior to the election. 
In relation to section 36, the context of the amendments, in both the speeches 
before the House and in the Select Committee report on the proposed 
amendments, was very much one of the failure of the judiciary to give the 
intended effect to the language of the provision as it previously stood. The 
courts, it was said, had raised the bar for establishing anticompetitive behaviour 
too high, making the success of actions against those using their market power 
for anticompetitive purposes unlikely. 52 Clear signals would now be sent to the 
courts as to how the provision was to be interpreted, by aligning our legislation 
with that of Australia and adopting her jurisprudence. Importantly for the 
promotion of competition, the amended provisions would bring certainty to its 
application for business so that legitimate competitive behaviour would not be 
deterred; "the point is that business wants certainty, and wants good quality, 
tidy law, and that is what we will give it."53 
The Commerce Amendment Act (No.2) 2001 brought the following changes to 
section 36: 
• The threshold of the dominant position was replaced with one of a 
'substantial degree of power'; 
• The prohibition on the 'use' of that power for a proscribed purpose 
became a prohibition on taking advantage of that power; 
• The proscribed purposes specified could be 'inferred from the conduct of 
any relevant person or from any other relevant circumstances'. 
52 Hon P Swain, MP (4 April 2001) 591 NZPD 8734. 
53 D Cunliffe, MP (4 April 2001) 591 NZPD 8741. 
23 
New Zealand's rules for governing anti-competitive behaviour by a firm with 
market power now mirrored almost exactly those of section 46 of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act 1974. 
On the face of it, then, it appeared that the objectives of both Labour and the 
Alliance found satisfaction in the amending legislation. The amendments to 
section 36 specifically proposed by Labour were enacted. The limited 
application of the section had been corrected through the lowering of the 
dominance threshold. The hypothetical 'use' test that had allowed Telecom to 
claim monopoly profits, was replaced by a phrase that ostensibly had been 
interpreted as simply a causal connection by the authoritative Australian case on 
the point, the High Court decision of Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (Queensland Wire). 54 The ability to infer a 
proscribed purpose from conduct and circumstances meant that a potentially 
onerous evidential burden on a party wishing to establish anti-competitive 
conduct was expressly removed. Seemingly the effects of conduct would now 
be given consideration when determining anti-competitive behaviour. All of this 
pointed to a provision with wider scope of application and fewer barriers to 
successful enforcement. 
VII THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CHANGES 
A number of commentators have asserted that section 36 in its new guise has 
brought little, if any, significant change. 55 Have then the amendments 
introduced by the Labour-Alliance coalition brought any tangible change to 
New Zealand's laws governing the misuse of market power? 
54 Queensland Wire Industries Pty Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd ( 1989) 167 CLR 177 
(HCA). 
55 see generally Stephen Land and Tim Clarke "The Commerce Amendment Act 200 I" (200 I) 7 
NZBLQ 217, 222; MR Dean and Tom Weston Competition law Update (New Zealand Law 
Society, Wellington 2001) 39. 
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A From Dominance to Substantial Degree of Power in a Market 
The change to the threshold of market power required to bring about liability 
under section 36 did not change any of the questions asked in detennining the 
relevant market, or to the level of power held by the firm alleged to have 
engaged in anti-competitive conduct. The parameters of the market are defined 
in section 3(1A) of the Commerce Act as being a market in New Zealand for 
goods and services as well as other goods and services that, as a matter of fact 
and commercial common sense, are substitutable for them. Factors to be 
considered in determining the relevant market include: the product in question; 
the geographical area within which the competition operates; the functional 
levels of the competitors and how much time is needed for customers and 
suppliers to respond to the acts of the competitors. 
Prior to the 2001 refom1s, the elements to be considered in determining whether 
a firm had the requisite degree of market power were listed in section 3(8) of the 
Act. These were the firm's share of the market, technical knowledge, access to 
materials or capital, the extent to which the fim1 was constrained by the conduct 
of competitors, actual and potential, and by the conduct of suppliers or acquirers 
of goods or services in that market. These same elements will still be considered 
despite the repeal of that section, as these same factors are referred to in 
Australian case law,56 and specifically provided for in section 46(3) of the Trade 
Practices Act. Primary importance is given to the barriers to entry in the relevant 
market. 57 
The replacement of 'dominant power in a market' with 'substantial degree of 
market power', as pointed out by then Minister of Commerce Hon P Swain, 
means that section 36 will now apply to a greater number of firms and markets 
and "signal to the courts that the test to be considered is whether a firm has 
sufficient power to ham1 the process of competition, rather than the test of what 
each of the words means."58 The objectives in the replacement of this threshold 
56 See Eastern Express Pty Ltd v General Newspapers Pty Ltd (1992) 35 FCR 43, 62 (FC). 
57 Re Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 25 FLR 169,188 (FC). 
58 Hon P Swain, MP (4 April 2001) 591 NZPD 8734. 
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were obvious, that of circumventing the dictionary definition of dominance 
applied by the Court of Appeal in the AMPS-A case, so that all firms with power 
to hann the process of competition would be captured by the prohibition. In 
practice it is difficult to detem1ine whether the definition provided by the Court 
of Appeal had any significant impact on cases brought under section 36 as there 
is no measure of firms that have been deterred from bringing actions believing 
themselves to be unable to establish the dominance of the alleged wrongdoer. 
Of the section 36 cases that have reached the High Court since the AMPS-A 
decision however, none have failed for want of establishing dominance. Indeed 
the Court of Appeal itself had sought to soften the impact of the AMPS-A 
decision in Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission (Port Nelson) in which 
Gault J stated that the earlier definition of the court had not shifted the concept 
of dominance from where it had been derived; the idea that a dominant fim1 
being one that could act to all intents and purposes independently of its 
competitors. 59 What needed to be borne in mind, it was stated, was the 
distinction between the concept of dominance and the test for its existence, 
which incorporated an economic analysis of the elements of market power. The 
threshold contained in section 36 was deemed to contemplate "a dominant 
position in which there still is a perceived need to act aggressively. A dominant 
position is not one that is so controlling that it is impenetrable."60 
But to how many firms and to what level of market power will the 'substantial 
degree' threshold apply? The definition of 'substantial' within the Act does not 
apply to section 3661 and there is no other guidance on this point within the Act 
itself. If the courts are to give effect to Parliamentary intention, the answer to 
this must be informed by the relevant Australian jurisprudence. 
The Australian jurisprudence on this point itself is rather vague. In the 
explanatory memorandum to the Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986, in which 
the Australian legislature itself introduced the notion of a substantial degree of 
market power, it was stated this provided a lower threshold than that of 
59 see Continental Can, above. 
60 Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission [ 1996) 3 NZLR 554, 574 (CA). 
6 1 Commerce Act 1986, s 2( 1 )(A) . 
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dominance or the ability to substantially control a market. Judicial interpretation 
of the threshold has held the tenn to signify 'large or weighty', 'considerable, 
solid or big. ' 62 Indeed the Australian judiciary has noted that the threshold is 
quantifiably imprecise and calculated to conceal a lack of precision.
63 What is 
apparent is that it is possible for more than one firm to have a substantial degree 
of power in a market at any one time.
64 From this it would seem that the new 
threshold sits somewhere between the notions of dominance and the section 
2(1A) definition of 'real or of substance,' a rather broad definition that will no 
doubt tum on the facts of each particular case. 
When the Commerce Act was first enacted, dominance was considered 
appropriate to the New Zealand business environment in which many sectors of 
the economy comprised few players. 
65 By adopting the equivalent Australian 
position, New Zealand has in essence taken on a threshold considered suitable 
in an economy significantly larger than our own.
66 Certainly in a number of 
industries it is questionable whether ew Zealand is able to sustain even two 
competitors. In telecommunications, domestic air services and free to air 
television, to name but a few industries, the non-incumbent competitors have 
struggled to be profitable. The likelihood that a firm capable of exerting its 
power for anti-competitive purposes in a New Zealand market would not be 
captured by a threshold of dominance appears small. 
Indeed the greater risk appears to be that firms lacking the degree of market 
power to truly justify section 36 attention may in fact now be captured by this 
adopted and lower threshold. Many of the submissions on the proposed 
amendment67 registered the concern that by lowering the threshold, a greater 
number of firms would be dete1Ted from legitimate competitive behaviour 
62 Dowling v Dalgety ( 1992) 34 FCR l 09 (FCA); Til/111a11s Butcheries v Australian Meat 
Jndust1y Employees Union ( 1979) 42 FLR 331 (FCA). 
63 Tillmans Butcheries v Australia11 Meat /11dust1y Employees Union, above, 338 Bowen CJ. 
64 see O'Keefe Nominees Pty Ltd v BP Australia ( 1990) ATPR 41-057 (FCA). In this case BP 
Australia, which was one of six competitors in the market, was seen to possess the requisite 
market power for the purposes of s 46. 
65 See also Department of Trade and Industry Review of the Commerce Act 1986 (August 1998). 
66 Craig Howie "Aussie Flavour Might Not Work in NZ Competition Law - Expert" (5 August 
2000) Th e Dominion Wellington 16. 
67 Including those from Telecom, Tranz Rail, Microsoft, Fletcher Challenge, Vodafone, 
Chapman Tripp and NZ Forest Industries Council. 
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contrary to the Labour party's stated goal of promoting competition. To counter 
this, the Minister stated that "the actual application of that test will need to take 
into account what makes economic sense in New Zealand conditions."
68 
This point appears to be a concession to the difference in scale between the 
economies of New Zealand and Australia, and recognition that the test for 
substantial degree of power will need to be handled differently in our smaller 
economy. If, as the Minister exhorted them to do, the courts are to pay heed to 
what makes sense in New Zealand conditions, then comparison with Australian 
findings of fact should be of little assistance to them. But as has been noted 
however, it is hard to see how the same words used in the Commerce Act can be 
interpreted any differently from how they have been interpreted in Australia. 
There is nothing in the Commerce Act itself that suggests that a different 
approach could or should be taken. 69 
How then would the courts assess whether or not the market power of a firm is 
substantial enough to warrant the attention of section 36? After identifying the 
relevant market and considering the various factors to be taken into account in 
an assessment of market power, the courts are then required to determine 
whether the market power established on the facts is substantial or 'large and 
weighty'. This requires a value judgement on the pa1i of the court and will turn 
largely on the definition of the market preferred by the court. With little further 
guidance other than that the threshold is lower than that of dominance, and the 
stated Parliamentary intention that it should be a test of whether a firm has 
sufficient market power to harm the process of competition,
70 there is ample 
scope for the net to be cast too wide. Guidance will inevitably be gained as our 
case law on the point builds, however the courts have come up with an 
undesirable interpretation before and the new threshold provides scope for it to 
happen again. 
68 Hon P Swain, MP (4 April 2001) 591 NZPD 8734. 
69 See Stephen Land and Tim Clarke "The Commerce Amendment Act 2001" (2001) 7 NZBLQ 
217,218. 
70 Hon P Swain, MP (4 April 2001) 591 NZPD 8735. 
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Given then that the intentions of the Government were to strengthen section 36 
to ensure the prohibition of anticompetitive acts by, in the words of the 
Alliance, 'large companies that dominate their market sector', and those of 
Labour, 'large corporations dominating their market sector through foreign 
investment and the corporatisation and privatisation of fom1erly State-owned 
operations', it is questionable whether the threshold of substantial degree of 
market power satisfies this intention accurately. The lower threshold appears 
likely to capture more firms than is appropriate in the New Zealand economy. 
While the Alliance may have been pleased with the very wide application of the 
prohibition, it seems that the more economy-focused Labour may in fact have 
got more than it bargained for. The wider than intended reach of section 36 has 
increased the number of firms that need to be wary of its application, potentially 
resulting in a far greater deterrence of competitive behaviour than was 
previously the case. These businesses also face the added uncertainty of further 
inconsistent or undesirable interpretation by the courts, the same concerns that 
initiated the drive for reform in the first place. 
B Taking Advantage Not Using 
Under the amended Commerce Act, a £inn found to possess a substantial degree 
of market power must not 'take advantage' of that power for one of the purposes 
proscribed in subsections 36(2)(a), (b) or (c).At the time of the amendment, the 
Australian authority on taking advantage came from High Court of Australia 
decision in Queensland Wire. In the context of refusing to supply a product to a 
downstream competitor, the court examined the issue of whether taking 
advantage incorporated notions of unfair, predatory or morally blameworthy 
behaviour. The court was unanimous in its classification of the phrase in a non-
pejorative sense, essentially rendering this limb of the provision to be a causal 
connection between the market power of the fim1 and its anticompetitive 
purpose. To take advantage of one' s market power was simply to use it. The 
majority of the court found the respondent to have taken advantage of its market 
power by virtue of the fact that its refusal to supply the plaintiff with a product 
was made possible by its position in the market and absence of competing 
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suppliers.71 In so doing it introduced the counterfactual test for taking 
advantage; that a firm would be taking advantage of its market power if it acted 
otherwise than it would be expected to behave in a competitive market. 
This causal connection was further elucidated in the case of Natwest Australia 
Bank v Baral Gerrard Strapping Systems Ltd72 in which it was stated that 
connection could be demonstrated by showing "a reliance by the contravener 
upon its market power to insulate it from the sanctions that competition would 
normally visit upon its conduct."73 
As stated previously the requirement to use this counterfactual test, and its 
inappropriate application in Telecom v Clear were precisely the points that the 
reforms of the Labour-Alliance coalition sought to obviate. The New Zealand 
Court of Appeal, although unable to expressly overturn the decision of their 
Lordships, had subsequently expressed dissatisfaction that the 'use' test they 
pronounced must be applied to determine use of market power in every case. 74 
Less than one month following the introduction to the New Zealand legislation 
of the term 'take advantage', the High Court of Australia reconsidered the issue 
of taking advantage of market power in Me/way Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert 
Hicks Pty Ltd (Melway). 75 Another case involving essentially a refusal to 
supply, the court leveled a number of criticisms at the reasoning behind the 
decision reached in Queensland Wire. Echoing the sentiments expressed by 
Gault J in Port Nelson the majority of the court stated that instead of the 
counterfactual test, "direct observation may lead to the correct conclusion."76 
71 Queensland Wire, above, 192 Mason CJ and Wilson J; 198 Deane J; 203 Dawson J: 216 
Toohey J. 
72 Natwest Australia Bank v Bora/ Gerrard Strapping Systems Ltd ( 1992) ATPR 41-196 (FCA) . 
73 Natwest, above, 40-644, French J. 
74 Port Nelson , above, 577 Gault J: "while it is not easy to see why the use of a dominant 
position should not be determined simply as a question of fact without the need to postulate 
artificial scenarios, we are content in this case to adopt that approach." 
75 Me/way Publishing Pty Ltd v Robert Hicks Pty Ltd (200 I) 205 CLR I (HCA). 
76 Me/way, above, 24. 
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While acknowledging that the counterfactual test was useful in determining 
whether advantage of market power had been taken, the assumptions on which 
this analysis was based needed to be grounded in fact: 77 
It is one thing to compare what [the ftrm] has done with what it might be thought to do if 
it lacked that power. It is a different thing to compare what it has done with what it 
would do in circumstances that are completely divorced from the reality of the market. 
By grounding the test in the reality of the market, the majority in Melway 
allayed concerns that the test could be corrupted by hypothetical scenarios that 
bore no resemblance to the market in which the firms actually operated. On the 
facts of that case Melway, whom it was established had a substantial degree of 
power in the relevant market, and had refused the supply of their street 
directories to prevent the respondent from competing with their existing 
wholesale distributors, were held not to have taken advantage of their position 
because they were in effect maintaining a distribution system that they had in 
place prior to gaining substantial power in the market. Melway's behaviour was 
classed as a tennination of a distributorship and their action one of protecting a 
business practice, that they found beneficial. 
Ironically the Melway decision could be construed as placing Australian case 
law on taking advantage in very much the same position as had previously 
existed in New Zealand under the Privy Council decision in Telecom v Clear. 
By allowing Melway to refuse the supply of its product on the grounds that it 
would do so in a competitive market, the High Court of Australia endorsed the 
principle that a dominant firn1 can be justified in the exercise of what appears to 
be an anticompetitive act; that of refusing access of a competitor to a market. 
The decision has arguably ushered into our competition law the legitimate 
business justification defence, 78 and thereby increased the arsenal of the 
dominant firm when countering section 36 actions. In the post-Melway decision 
of Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Ltd v Commerce Commission ,79 the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal considered justifications advanced by the 
77 Me/way , above, 25. 
78 See generally Mark N Berry "The Uncertainty of Monopolistic Conduct: A Comparative 
Review of Three Jurisdictions" (2001) 32 Law & Pol Int Bus 263, 302-303. 
79 Carter Holt Harvey Building Products Ltd v Commerce Commission (5 November 2001) 
Court of Appeal , Wellington CA I 80/00. 
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dominant firm that the predatory pricing of which they were accused was for the 
purposes of maintaining market share while developing a new product, and 
meeting pressure exerted by their distributors. While the court rejected these 
arguments on the facts, they were not rejected on principle, pointing to their 
availability as a means to escape section 36 liability. 
As a result there appears to be little substantive difference in the application of 
the test that New Zealand courts are to apply in the determination of taking 
advantage, as they were required to do under the previous test for use. While the 
Court of Appeal has since acknowledged that the counterfactual test need not be 
applied in every case, they have in at least one case following the decision in 
Me/way remained content to apply it. 80 The counterfactual test while no longer 
mandatory, is still the generally accepted test for, or at least a basis for 
establishing, the taking advantage of market power. The fact that New Zealand 
had dropped the term 'use' for a term that the High Court of Australia had 
deemed to mean simply 'use' suggested that there would be no change to this 
limb of the prohibition. The reality is that the subsequent decision in Me/way 
has once again rendered this limb of the prohibition to constitute more than a 
mere causal connection. Contrary to the express wishes of the Alliance it has 
also provided another area of legal vagary potentially exploitable by a dominant 
player to escape section 36 sanction, or at least ensure that the ensuing legal 
proceedings are protracted. 
C The Infereuce of Purpose 
The final limb to be established to constitute a breach of section 36 is that the 
substantial degree of market power has been taken advantage of for one of the 
proscribed purposes in subsections 36(2)(a), (b) or (c).Under subsection 2(5)(b) 
of the Act, that purpose need only be one of the purposes of the conduct 
provided that it was a substantial purpose of the firm in engaging in that 
conduct. 
80 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (200 I) I O TCLR 182 
(CA). 
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The addition of section 36B to the Act allows the court to infer purpose of the 
alleged contravener from the conduct of any relevant person or from any other 
relevant circumstances. The manner in which purpose can be infe1Ted was 
demonstrated in Queensland Wire where the court was able to infer a proscribed 
purpose from the evidence that BHP had not offered any business justification 
for its refusal to supply Y-bar and that this refusal was inconsistent with its 
normal selling policy in relation to its other products in which it faced 
competition for the supply thereof. 81 
New Zealand cou1is are then able to infer the purpose from the evidence 
presented to it, in so far as they show the likely intended consequences of the 
dominant fim1's conduct. This certainly appears to go some way to reducing the 
evidential burden on the party alleging a breach of section 36, in that they do not 
need to furnish evidence of the subjective intent of the dominant firm. It is 
questionable however whether there was ever a need to do this prior to the 
amendment. In Port Nelson Gault J summed up the situation thus: 82 
Much has been written on this distinction which generally is unimportant in practice. 
There will be very little difference in most cases between ascertaining subjective purpose 
by inference from what was said and done and ascribing objectively a purpose from 
evidence of what was said and done. 
In practical terms a plaintiff would attempt to establish anti-competitive purpose 
through the objective inference of the natural and probable consequences of the 
defendant's conduct, while the defendant would seek to establish that they did 
not possess an anti-competitive purpose. 
Indeed the select conunittee report acknowledged that the introduction of 
section 36B made no difference to the approach already adopted by the courts, 
however it felt the amendment necessary for two reasons: 83 
Firstly, it will make transparent what has been good practice. Secondly, it reinforces the 
move by the Court of Appeal to play down the significance of the debate on whether 
purpose is a subjective or objective test. 
81 Queensland Wire, above, 50,011 Mason CJ and Wilson J. 
82 Port Nelson, above, 564. 
83 Commerce Amendment Bill 2001, no 296-2, (the commentary), xiv. 
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It may be that Labour felt that the section 36B provision to infer purpose from 
'any other relevant circumstances' would allow anti-competitive effects to be 
considered. However the absence of any Australian precedent on this point, and 
the very fact that numerous unsuccessful attempts have been made to introduce 
an effects test into section 46 of the Trade Practices Act would suggest 
otherwise. The provision itself still focuses on the purpose of the alleged 
wrongdoer, so while a resulting anti-competitive effect may assist in the 
establishment of an anti-competitive purpose, it is not the effect that is the 
measure of whether the conduct is anti-competitive or not. The prohibition 
remains grounded in the intent of the firm rather than whether competition is in 
fact hindered by their behaviour. Given their awareness that the introduction of 
section 36B would make no substantive difference to the existing evidential 
burden of establishing a section 36 breach, and the concern that both Labour and 
the Alliance had expressed at the difficulty of establishing purpose, it is 
surpnsmg that greater change was not made at least in this limb of the 
prov1s10n. 
The question of establishing purpose may in any case be trivial. The bulk of 
jurisprudence on the point notes that purpose and the use (or take advantage) 
limb of the prohibition are very much interconnected, and that the distinction 
between pro-competitive and anti-competitive behaviour is at best a very fine 
one. In Telecom v Clear the Privy Council noted that if "a person has used his 
dominant position it is hard to imagine a case in which he would have done so 
otherwise than for the purpose of producing an anti-competitive effect."84 
Indeed all firms could be characterised as behaving anti-competitively in that 
they advance their own interests at the expense of the competition as part of the 
nom1al competitive process. It would appear then that an anti-competitive 
purpose could be read into almost any act by a firm in the normal process of 
competition. The danger stems from the fact that some fim1s pose a greater 
threat to competition in pursuing a purpose that is characterised as anti-
competitive, because their market power means that they are in a position of 
advantage in doing so and therefore much more likely to succeed because of the 
84 Telecom v Clear, above, 402. 
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relative lack of competitive constraints upon them. Hence the substance of the 
prohibition is in the degree of market power and the use thereof. This accords 
with the view expressed by Scalia J in Eastman Kodak85and cited by the 
majority in Melway. 86 
The filter then that distinguishes pro- and anti-competitive behaviour is the use 
or take advantage limb of the prohibition . If market power has been employed in 
certain conduct as evidenced by the fact it can't be considered an act that would 
have been carried out regardless of that power, then it is anti-competitive. The 
Commerce Committee87 and officials from the Ministry of Economic 
Development88 endorse this view. The purpose limb of the prohibition therefore 
seems to serve very little practical function in the establishment of a section 36 
case. 
VIII THE PURPOSE STATEMENT: LONG TERM CONSUMER 
BENEFIT 
The signals of the Australian jurisprudence on anti-competitive conduct have 
been revealed as less than clear. Scope remains for the courts to colour their 
decisions with their own belief of the prohibition's function. The other 
interpretive signal provided by the amendment, it would seem, could be found 
in the new purpose statement in section 1 A of the Act. This reads ' The purpose 
of this Act is to promote competition in markets for the long tenn benefit of 
consumers within New Zealand.' 
While at least superficially this statement accords well with the Alliance's 
concentration on consumer protection and Labour's focus on advancing 
consumer welfare through the promotion of competition, it is debatable what, if 
anything, the statement will do to assist the courts in their application of the 
Act. Under section 5 (1) of the Interpretation Act 1999, courts are required to 
give meaning to legislation from its text and in light of its purpose. Having been 
85 Eastman Kodak, above, 488. 
86 Me/way, above, 18 . 
87 Commerce Amendment Bill 2001 , no 296-2, above, xiii. 
88 Ministry of Economic Development The 'Use· Test in Section 36 of the Commerce Act (CAB/ 
MED/9, Wellington, 2000) 3. 
provided with such a purpose, the courts will no doubt feel compelled to try and 
give effect to it. The purpose statement, however, suffers from an ambiguity that 
reduces its effectiveness as a tool for guiding the courts in applying the 
provisions of the Commerce Act and section 36 in particular. Indeed even the 
intention of Parliament with regard to the purpose statement is ambiguous. 
When the Commerce Amendment (No. 1) Bill first came before the House, the 
Chair of the Commerce Committee declared that the purpose statement:89 
... makes it clear that the New Zealand Parliament supports a welfare-based, Harvard 
School approach that puts the interests of consumers first . However, we have taken due 
account of the arguments that we have to take a long-term perspective and see dynamic 
efficiency play in the market, and for that reason it is the long-term interests of 
consumers that appear in the new purpose statement. 
The very mention of dynamic efficiency gives Labour's concept of consumer 
welfare efficiency-driven connotations of aggregate wealth, as espoused by the 
Chicago School. 90 The reference to 'long-term' benefit in the purpose certainly 
suggests a focus on dynamic efficiency,91 but equally there may be no focus on 
efficiency at all, given that a reference to efficiency in the purpose statement 
initially proposed, was expressly removed at the Select Committee stage. 
Efficiency was not to be looked at by the courts. It was deemed to be a 
consideration only for the Commerce Commission when authorising restrictive 
trade practices. 92 
The select committee report itself downplays the significance of the purpose 
statement: "We consider that the addition of the purpose statement will not 
fundamentally change the interpretation of the Act."93 Officials from the 
Ministry of Economic Development certainly felt this way too, seeing the main 
impact of the statement as being in the measurement of public benefit by the 
Commerce Commission during the authorisation process. In their view the 
scheme of the Act was such that: 94 
89 Hon D Cunliffe ZPD 
90 See Bork, above, 193 
9 1 See James Mellsop "What is the Objective of the Commerce Act" (April 2002) Competition 
and Regulation Tim es 4. 
92 Conunerce Amendment Bill 200 I , no 296-2, above, vii . 
93 Conunerce Amendment Bill 200 I, no 296-2 , above, vii . 
94 Ministry of Economic Development Th e Pwpose Statement in the Commerce Act (CAB! 
MED/6, Wellington, 2000) 9. 
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... there is a presumption that the goal of long term benefits to consumers will be achieved 
through the promotion of competition. However it seems consistent with the purpose 
statement that this presumption may be rebutted if the long term benefits to consumers 
may be achieved through efficiency gains that outweigh any anti-competitive detriment. 
This suggests that the promotion of efficiency could be considered a greater 
means of securmg consumer welfare than competition, the very means 
envisaged in the words of the purpose statement itself. Section 36 
contraventions, however, cannot in themselves receive Commerce Commission 
authorisation under the Act, which suggests that efficiency-seeking conduct is 
no defence to misuses of market power. 
A further confusing element is evident in the fact that the purpose statement for 
Part 4A of the Commerce Act, which deals with the regulation of the electricity 
lines businesses, expressly aims to promote the efficient operation of that 
9-
market. ) The absence of a simi Jar phrase from the section 1 A purpose 
statement tends to support the argument that efficiency is not to be considered in 
the pursuit of consumer welfare through competition. 
It all serves to demonstrate the level of confusion that exists as to what the 
purpose of our competition laws really is. Given that there are conceivably a 
myriad of different factors that could be considered as contributing to consumer 
benefit, the new purpose statement can really mean anything to anyone. It is 
debatable whether the politicians themselves knew exactly what was meant by 
the purpose statement and its reference to consumer benefit. 
The socially conscious thrust of the Alliance's policies would seem to imbue the 
purpose statement with notions of allowing competitors access to markets to 
give consumers freedom of choice, and redistributing income between 
producers and consumers of anti-competitively priced goods thereby driving 
prices down. To this extent the courts would be able to read into the statute a 
95 Commerce Act 1986, s 57E. 
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function such as the elimination of monopoly profits, as attempted by the Court 
of Appeal,96 but shelved by the Privy Council in Telecom v Clear. 
Labour's concept of promoting competition for consumer benefit instead 
appears consistent with that expressed by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and founded upon the promotion of consumer welfare through 
efficiencies derived from competition. Their assumption being that competitive 
markets deliver optimal outcomes for both producers and consumers alike. 
Issues of consumer protection were seen as more appropriately undertaken on 
an industry basis through such means as the Telecommunications Service 
Obligation and the Electricity Complaints Commission. 
Just how this purpose statement will affect the courts' interpretation of section 
36 and in particular the consideration of legitimate business justifications under 
the take advantage limb, is an open question. 
It would seem likely that the courts will interpret the provision as a tool for 
promoting consumer benefits, such as lower prices and greater choice of product 
and supplier, through the efficient operation of competitive markets . However 
the reference to 'long-tern1' brings a speculative element into play and makes it 
even more questionable whether the purpose statement can be given a practical 
effect by the courts. In trying to give effect to this element of the purpose 
statement, the courts may be less inclined to look at the immediate effects of a 
firm's anti-competitive actions on the assumption that future competition will 
erode any monopolistic practices. Conversely they may decide that any act that 
has a short term adverse impact on competition will necessarily limit long tern1 
competition and not lead to long term consumer benefit, or even that smaller 
competitors who are inefficient in the short term should be protected so that 
consumer benefits might be achieved in future. 
96 See Clear Communications v Telecom C01poratio11 of New Zealand Ltd (1993) 5 TCLR 413, 
436 (CA) per Gault J: "I cannot accept that the objects of the Commerce Act are served by a 
method of pricing that secures the profits of a firm in a dominant position." 
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If the select committee are to believed, then the courts should not diverge from 
their existing interpretation of section 36, but is this the idea of allowing new 
competitors to achieve equal footing with incumbent participants as originally 
endorsed in ARA v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd 97 or the Privy 
Council's agreement that a monopolist shouldn't be required to hold an 
umbrella over inefficient competitors in Telecom v Clear? While the general 
dissatisfaction with the Privy Council's decision might suggest the former, it 
seems again that Parliament has handed the courts a less than clear and 
potentially dangerous signal. 
IX THE EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENTS 
To summarise then, the intention of the Labour-Alliance coalition in amending 
the Commerce Act was to promote competition in the interests of consumers by 
providing simple legislation prohibiting the anticompetitive acts of firms 
dominant in their market sector, to provide clear signals to the courts about how 
the legislation was to be interpreted, and to give consideration to the anti-
competitive effects of those firms' conduct in determining whether the conduct 
was acceptable or not. 
The amended section 36 instead appears at the very least uncertain m its 
application. It arguably constrains the legitimate competitive behaviour of fim1s 
who really should be outside the scope of the prohibition, provides less than 
clear interpretive signals to the courts thereby enabling them to give unintended 
meanings to its terms, and it seemingly gives no further consideration to the 
effects of a dominant firm's behaviour than was available under the provision 
prior to its amendment. The addition of a purpose statement has served only to 
add another potential ambiguity to the interpretation of the statute. 
What other options might have been considered to strengthen section 36 and 
ensure an effective prohibition on the misuse of market power and the curbing 
97 ARA v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd (1987] 2 NZLR 647, 671 (HC). 
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of anti-competitive behaviour by large firms that was deemed so necessary in 
the lead up to the election. 
A The Failure of Certainty 
A fundamental concern with any regulatory refom1 is over the issue of certainty. 
This is particularly true when dealing with market behaviour as no government 
wants to stymie business and thereby reduce the overall productivity of the 
economy. Economic perfonnance is the driver of modem government as social 
welfare intrinsically tied up in the ability to pay for it. A stagnant economy will 
not lead to the improvement of the overall welfare of its consumers. The 
Coalition Government was strong in its commitment to providing tidy and 
certain legislation so that business would know the parameters of prohibited 
conduct and could get on with operating efficiently and competing fairly. In 
adopting the Australian approach to the policing of unilateral market power, the 
Government felt this certainty would be provided by 14 years of Australian 
jurisprudence, yet in doing so they effectively devalued any certainty provided 
by prior New Zealand jurisprudence on the point. As stated previously, 
however, the courts have been handed few clearer signals in the interpretation of 
section 36 than they had prior to the 2001 reforms. 
The pivotal certainty issue surrounds the question of which firms come within 
the ambit of the section 36 prohibition. Given that competitive and anti-
competitive conduct often appear very similar, the very reason that the 
prohibition contains a threshold is so that the behaviour of only a certain 
number of firms, those with sufficient market power to actually harm the 
process of competition, is constrained. The uncertainty of the adopted 
substantial degree of power threshold means that a greater number of firms are 
likely to hesitate before pursuing legitimate competitive actions in the fear that 
they will be captured by the prohibition. 
In his supplementary order paper, Hon M Bradford sought not to change the 
actual threshold of market dominance but to amend the definition of dominance 
within section 3(8) of the Act by substituting 'high degree of market power' for 
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'dominant influence'. While this was ridiculed by the Coalition Government: 
"well, no-one knew what that was ... it would have caused great confusion,"98 it 
did at least have the benefit of retaining the existing language of the section. 
Also, Hon M Bradford purportedly sought a return to the threshold to a level 
previously understood by the business community from the cases of Re 
Magnum Corporation v Dominion Breweries Ltd 99 and the High Court decision 
in the AMPS-A case' 00 in which dominance had been characterised as 
constituting sufficient market power or economic strength to enable the finn to 
behave to an appreciable extent in a discretionary manner without suffering 
detrimental effects in the relevant markets. 
While Hon M Bradford's reform may not have brought any greater degree of 
certainty than that achieved by the change to a substantial degree of market 
power, value might be found in his attempt to amend the definition of 
dominance rather than the threshold itself. Could certainty not be achieved by a 
quantifiable definition of dominance? There is precedent for this in at least one 
overseas jurisdiction. Section 19(2) of the German Act Against Restraints of 
Competition contains a refutable presumption that a firm is dominant in a 
market if it possesses one-third of the share of that market. Firms that come 
within this definition then have the possibility of establishing that for other 
reasons such as low entry barriers to that particular market, they ca1mot be 
considered to be in a position of dominance. Merit can certainly be found in the 
suggestion. The setting of a presumption too would have the advantage of 
taking into account the particular characteristics of the New Zealand economy, 
unlike the adoption of an Australian threshold. By introducing a quantifiable 
market share presumption, an expectation would be set in the business 
community as to which firn1s would need to be wary of section 36 liability, also 
it would remove the degree of speculation involved over the courts' 
interpretation of the threshold. Concerns over the level not being appropriate in 
certain circumstances would be mollified by allowing a firn1 to argue that 
98 Hon P Swain (8 May 2001) 592 NZPD 9072 . 
99 Re Magnum Co1poralio11 Ltd v Dominion Breweries Ltd ( 1986) 2 TCLR 177 (HC). 
100 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand v Commerce Commission ( 1991) 4 TCLR 509 (HC). 
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despite their existing market share, they do not possess the requisite market 
power. 
Given the existing scheme of the Commerce Act and the lack of quantifiable 
thresholds in other parts of the Act, it seems unlikely that such a measure would 
be introduced. Precedent for a refutable presumption does exist outside the Act 
however, as evidenced by the 'safe harbours ' prescribed by the Commerce 
Commission10 1 in its consideration of mergers and acquisitions and whether 
they are likely to lessen competition in a particular market. A similar guideline 
could have been published regarding the question of dominance for section 36 
purposes and indeed could still be done under the new threshold of substantial 
degree of market power. Firn1s that come within the presumption would then be 
required to consider the impact of their conduct lest it be characterised as anti-
competitive and face action from the Commerce Commission. Other smaller 
firms could be left to compete, subject only to the sanctions of the market. 
Another method of affording certainty not given explicit consideration during 
the reforms, is a procedure whereby clearance could be given for conduct by the 
Commerce Commission. A firm uncertain as to whether their conduct might be 
in violation of section 36 could apply to the Commerce Commission for a 
determination of whether their conduct would be likely to raise a section 36 
action from the Commission, prior to undertaking that conduct. While such an 
approach may raise issues of timeliness and response to market conditions, it 
too has merit, and is worthy of further consideration. 
Having set a level of market power a firn1 must possess in order to attract 
section 36 liability, the prohibition then needs to characterise the type of 
behaviour that those firn1s must be restrained from carrying out. If the 
Commerce Committee is to be believed, it is the take advantage limb of section 
36 that provides the filter between acceptable and unacceptable conduct. As 
stated previously, there has been little, if any, change effected to this component 
10 1 See Conunerce Commission Practice Note 4: The Commission 's Approach to Adjudicating 
on Business Acquisitions Under the Changed Threshold in Section 47 - A Test of 
Substantially l essening Competition (Wellington, 2001) 28-9. 
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of section 36 by the 2001 reforms. Nor, it is asserted did there need to be. 
Removal of this limb would result in either a shackling of all conduct by large 
firms if anti-competitive purposes were readily inferred, or place too great a 
reliance on subjective evidence of purpose, the problems of which have been 
discussed earlier. The counterfactual test as espoused by the Privy Council in 
Telecom v Clear is an essentially sound filter of competitive and anti-
competitive behaviour, provided that the object of the section is clear and the 
warnings from Melway are borne in mind. The test must be grounded in reality 
and should not become a substitute for the actual question of whether advantage 
of market power has been taken. As such this limb provides the causal 
connection between the market power and the proscribed conduct; that the finn 
was able to carry out the conduct by reason of its market power. 
B The Case for an Effects Test 
It is, then, by defining the proscribed conduct that the next big issue with 
section 36 should have been considered. Given that it was a stated aim of both 
coalition parties that anti-competitive effects be given consideration, a closer 
examination of the effects test is appropriate. 
The mam reasonmg behind the introduction of an effects test, is that by 
determining acceptability or otherwise of a firm's conduct through the 
consideration of its effect on competition, the requirement to establish an 
anticompetitive purpose on the part of the firm possessing market power would 
be replaced. This would remove a potentially onerous evidential burden on a 
party alleging a breach of section 36 and therefore encourage greater use of the 
provision in policing anti-competitive behaviour. It also has the advantage of 
basing the prohibition in its very essence, the restriction of competition in a 
market. If competition in a market has been reduced because a firm with market 
power has acted in a manner available to it by virtue of that market power, is 
there really a need to discover whether it was the fim1 ' s purpose to do so? 
Another reason advanced for the adoption of an effects test is that it addresses 
the public concern of the increasing concentration of big industry players and 
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natural monopolies stifling competition, by focusing on the effect of their 
actions on the rest of the competition. The effects test has as a result typically 
been associated with the socially-motivated competition policy and the political 
left. 
As mentioned earlier, Labour had shifted away from the introduction of an 
effects test despite backing the Alliance's attempt to introduce such a test in 
1999. While Labour had been dissuaded from such a test following the Ministry 
of Commerce's discussion paper, the Alliance had not. Failing to advance the 
effects test any further, the Alliance sought instead to strengthen the prohibition 
by instead reversing the onus of proof of purpose. This would deem a finn to be 
taking advantage of their substantial market power in breach of section 36 
unless it could prove otherwise. This option was put to the Commerce 
Committee as an option alongside the inference of purpose proposal, but was 
dropped from Supplementary Order Paper (No. 37) following representations 
from business leaders that it would lead to vexatious or frivolous actions being 
undertaken by a firm's competitors. 102 To ameliorate this it was proposed that 
the reverse onus apply only in actions brought by the Commerce Commission. 
This, however, raised a further concern that private enforcement of the 
provision would be undem1ined and instead too much reliance would be placed 
on public enforcement. As well as this, concern around the novelty of the 
proposal, 103 namely the fact that it did not appear in the competition laws of 
other countries, and the uncertainty it may cause in the business world, meant 
that it too was dropped. 
The introduction of an effects test as either a replacement of or complement to 
the existing purpose test in section 46 of the Trade Practices Act has come under 
consideration on numerous occasions across the Tasman. 104 On each occasion it 
has been rejected. 
102 "Government Rethinking Changes to Competition Law" 27 December 2000) The New 
Zealand Herald Auckland A 11 . 
103 Cabinet Minute "Commerce Act: Strengthening the Prohibition Against a Misuse of a 
Dominant Position" (28 March 2000) FIN (00) 54, 38c. 
104 An effects test has been put forward for consideration by the Blunt Committee in 1979, the 
Griffiths Committee in 1989, the Cooney Committee in 1991, the Hilmer Committee in 
1993, Reid Conm1ittee in 1997, Baird Conm1ittee in 1999, the House of Representatives 
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Crucial to its repeated rejection by the various committees, the effects test has 
been criticised for giving the prohibition too wide an application and bringing 
too much legitimate business conduct within its ambit. Inadvertent or 
efficiency-driven conduct could be at risk because the test doesn't distinguish 
between socially beneficial and socially detrimental behaviour. Companies 
would be forced to evaluate the potential effects of their every action on 
competitors both actual and potential. The process of effective competition 
involves engaging in conduct which will potentially produce the very ends 
proscribed by section 46. Prohibiting conduct by reference to its effect may 
therefore challenge the competitive process itself. A purpose based test has been 
seen to have the advantage of an appropriate interpretation and greater level of 
· C b · 105 certamty 1or usmess. 
Other criticisms of the effects test are that there is an issue of causation to be 
considered, and a question over how long a period the effect needs to arise. The 
effects of conduct on competition in a market may not be felt for quite some 
time. By contrast an immediate effect may later be countered by the actions of 
existing or new competitors. 
There is certainly credence in the arguments that an effects test increases the 
scope for more legitimate conduct to be considered within the provision and 
given the drive to align this country's competition laws with those of Australia, 
it is not surprising that the New Zealand Government has shied from adopting a 
test rejected consistently across the Tasman. However it is noticeable that the 
Australian discussion on the relative merits of the purpose and effects test has 
been far more comprehensive than that on our shores. The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has been at the forefront of 
calls for the introduction of an effects test 106 and has been supported in its calls 
Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration in 2001 and is 
currently before the Dawson Committee. 
105 See Mitchell Landrigan, Anne Peters and Jason Soon "An effects test under s46 of the Trade 
Practices Act: Identifying the Real Effects" (2002) 9 CCLJ 2 for a discussion of the reasons 
outlined by the various committees for and against the adoption of an effects test. 
106 Ross Jones "The Path to Competitive Discipline" (I I July 2002 ) Australian Financial 
Review Sydney 63. 
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by small business. 107 Big business on the other hand has waged a public 
campaign against both the ACCC and the effects test, mistrustful of the powers 
that the ACCC already wields and no doubt fearful of the potential impact such 
a test would have on their ability to compete. 108 Big business has been 
supported in its stance by the Productivity Commission, a government think 
tank charged with continuously looking for ways to improve the efficiency of 
the Australian economy. 109 
Concerns about a resulting deterrence of competitive behaviour can be allayed 
however, particularly if one believes the indications that the taking advantage 
limb is also key to the determination of whether conduct is legitimate or not. It 
is not every act by a firm with market power that produces an anti-competitive 
effect that is condemned by section 36. That market power must have been 
employed in the act. Also, by restricting the scope of the prohibition to firms 
that are in a position to control their particular markets, i.e. those that are in the 
greatest position to affect competition, the number of firms required to consider 
the effects of their conduct is limited. On such an approach, a threshold of 
dominance even to the level proposed by the Court of Appeal in the AMPS-A 
case might not be inappropriate. 
Given the stated needs of strengthening the Commerce Act to curb the 
behaviour of large corporations through simple legislation that gives 
consideration to the anti-competitive effects of those firms' conduct, it is 
surprising that such an approach was not given more consideration. Indeed the 
balance struck by a prohibition aimed at a higher level of market power, with an 
objective filter, in which anti-competitive behaviour is determined by its effect 
on competition, appears more suitable to the aspirations of the Coalition 
Government than that of the lower threshold, objective filter and purpose based 
prohibition settled for. 
107 Michael Delaney "Trade Safeguards Need Balance" (9 July 2002) Australian Financial 
Review Sydney 63. 
108 Steven Kates "Rabid Watchdog 1eeds a Shorter Leash" (26 April 2002) Th e Australian 
Sydney 9. 
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X REASONS FOR THE REFORMS 
Why then did the Govenm1ent settle for such lightweight reform. It goes 
without saying that strong public statements whilst seeking election are likely to 
be subject to compromise upon the attainment of power. In the words of Herbert 
Hovenkamp: 11 0 
Few elements of statutory interpretation are more frustrating than the study of legislative 
history to determine a statute 's meanings. The debates and compromises leading to a 
statute ' s passage often contain conflicting statements, made by persons who were elected 
by disparate interest groups, who had different motives and different perceptions about 
what a statute would do . Sometimes legislative committees achieve compromises by 
making statutory language intentionally ambiguous, leaving to the courts to decide later 
which interpretation should prevail. 
Certainly these words ring true when the reforms finally embodied in the 
Commerce Amendment Act are examined. As mentioned previously, the 
passage of the Act was not straightforward. It was characterised by a series of 
delays, amendments and the inability of the Select Committee considering the 
Bill to agree on some of the fundamental amendments. The Commerce 
Committee was split evenly on the two key reforms to section 36, namely the 
threshold of substantial degree of market power and the substitution of ' use' 
with 'take advantage', hence the omission of these from the first Commerce 
Amendment Bill. Indeed agreement had still not been reached on those limbs of 
section 36 before the Commerce Amendment (No.2) Bill was tabled in the 
House. 
A Honouring Pledges 
Despite the numerous amendments that were made to the amendments and the 
raft of submissions received in response to the two supplementary order papers, 
the reforms of the Commerce Amendment Act remained largely those of 
Labour's pre-election policy or rather those proposed by the Ministry of 
Commerce in its discussion document of 1999. 
109 Stephen Bartholomeusz "Productivity Commission No Friend to an ACCC Seeking More 
Powers" (25 July 2002) The Age Melbourne 3. 
47 
Importantly from Labour's perspective, the enactment of their proposed reforms 
was seen to be in keeping with their pre-election promise, a virtue that they took 
pride in, and trumpeted as a key achievement during their term in 
government. 111 But in doing so, it appears that they either lost focus of the intent 
behind their refom1s, or assumed too greatly that the wording they chose in 
enacting those refonns would give effect to those intentions. Certainly the 
advice received from their officials in the Ministry of Commerce and its 
successor the Ministry of Economic Development did not deviate from that of 
their 1999 discussion paper, that the preferred option for refom1 lay in the 
adoption of the Australian approach. 
B The Influence of Officials 
That paper laid out the Ministry's perspective on the driving force behind the 
Commerce Act, that it was a means to facilitate gains in economic efficiency 
across the economy, 112 a view of competition law not unlike that espoused by 
the Australian Productivity Commission. To that end the role of the thresholds 
contained in the Commerce Act were threefold, to capture for scrutiny those 
activities likely to result in economic harm (i.e. exercises of market power that 
would result in efficiency losses), to not deter or prevent efficiency enhancing 
behaviour and to minimise uncertainty and costs of administration, compliance 
and enforcement. Importantly, these thresholds were only seen to be of benefit 
in so far as the ham, prevented was greater than the costs incurred through 
scrutiny and prohibition. 113 
In tem1s of the substantial degree of market power threshold, the Ministry's 
support was unwavering. The threshold from Australia would apply to some 
more firms, but only those to whom it should have applied but didn't because 
the economic approach to dominance had been supplanted by a dictionary 
definition. There was no evidence that a reduction of competitive and efficient 
11 0 H Hovenkamp Federal Antitrust Policy: Th e Law of Competition and its Practice (2ed, West 
Group, St Paul, Minnesota, 1999) 47. 
111 "Confident Clark Looks to Future" (December 27 2000) The Dominion Wellington 2. 
11 2 Ministry of Commerce, above, 3. 
11 3 Ministry of Commerce, above, 12. 
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behaviour had occurred as a result of this threshold in Australia. Any increase in 
compliance costs from the greater number of firms coming within the purview 
of the provision, would be outweighed by the overall benefits of stronger 
competition. 114 
By substituting 'take advantage' for 'use' the New Zealand courts would be 
availed of an approach less rigid than the counterfactual test previously laid 
down by the Privy Council. The courts would have the freedom to move away 
from the Privy Council formulation when appropriate, without adopting a 
subjective purpose driven approach. 115 The inference of purpose would codify 
the courts' existing good practice. 
The Ministry's comments are replicated consistently through the Government 
rhetoric on the 2001 amendments. Having not received any official advice 
contrary to its stated position, it is hardly surprising that Labour, a government 
devoted to keeping its pledges, saw its refonns carried through in their original 
form. 
C Harmonisation 
A constant theme running through the 2001 reforms was the benefits of bringing 
New Zealand's competition laws into line with those of Australia. In the 
documented consideration of the amendments to each limb of section 36, 
whatever advantage the change itself brought was always reinforced by the fact 
that consistency with our closest trading partner brought benefits of its own. 
However in light of the substantive changes that these reforms have, or haven't, 
brought to our laws on the misuse of market power, it is not unreasonable to 
think that the Government placed too much value in ham1onising for 
hannonising's sake. 
114 Ministry of Economic Development Official's Report on the Commerce Amendment Bill 
(CAB/ MED/18, Wellington, 2000) 5. 
115 Ministry of Economic Development The 'Use' Test in Section 36 of the Commerce Act 
(CAB/ MED/9, Wellington, 2000) 9. 
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Hannonisation it was stated would improve transparency and the ease with 
which businesses could operate across borders. For New Zealand producers it 
would ease access to a market consisting of approximately 20 million 
consumers. Differences between regulatory environments would require a firm 
wanting to operate in both New Zealand and Australia to comply with two 
different sets of rules and increase their costs therein, which could deter 
competition in both markets. A more closely aligned trans-Tasman commercial 
environment would also allow a common outward focus in commercial 
activities within the greater global market. 11 6 Overseas firms looking to move 
into or invest in the sizeable Australian market would be more inclined to move 
into New Zealand as well should they not face a different regulatory regime. 
But are these real benefits? In the words ofKerrin Vautier: 117 
The rationale for harmonisation has always been shaky, especially from an economics 
perspective. Essentially it has relied upon assertions of business certainty, reduced 
transaction/compliance costs and trade enhancement in the context of a 'single market'. 
But ex post verification of a positive correlation between harmonisation and, in 
particular, lower impediments to trade, has been lacking and such assertions have 
become more muted. 
Given that the three amendments to section 36 brought about by this 
ham1onisation could be characterised as inappropriate or inconsequential, and 
given too that the relevant provisions of the two countries as they previously 
stood were so similar as to be for all intents and purposes harmonised already, it 
seems that this aspiration and the resulting benefits peddled were overstated. 
Certainly without tangible evidence of those benefits, of which none was 
presented in the passage of the Act, the costs associated with the amendment of 
section 36 may tum out to be greater than any benefits foregone by retaining the 
previous prov1s1on. 
11 6 Hon P Swain, Minister of Commerce (Speech to Institute for International Research Ltd, 
Auckland, 13 March 2002). 
11 7 Kerrin Vautier "Competition Law and CER" (March 2001) Competition and Regulatory 
Times, 8. 
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D Industry Specific Regulation 
Electricity and telecommunications lifted the public profile of competition law 
in New Zealand. The failure of the previous Government to address the 
shortcomings of light-handed regulation in policing those industries had made 
competition a hot election issue in 1999. Both Labour and the Alliance had 
advocated regulatory regimes specific to those industries, and following the 
respective ministerial inquiries, new legislative controls were introduced. 
The amendments embodied in Part 4A of the Commerce Act give the 
Commerce Commission powers to impose price control on the electricity lines 
businesses, while also subjecting those businesses to tighter information 
disclosure requirements. The Telecommunications Act 2001 appointed a 
specific regulator, the Telecommunications Commissioner, to oversee issues 
arising in the industry. Rules for the provision of network access were set out, as 
were universal service obligations replacing the existing 'kiwi share' 
obligations. The public demands for tighter controls on these two utilities could 
be seen to have been addressed by the increased regulation manifested in these 
reforms, but again it is questionable whether they in fact have brought about any 
significant change. Control over the prices charged for utilities was always 
available to government under Part 4 of the Commerce Act. Previous 
governments had simply been unwilling to invoke them lest the image of light-
handed regulation be tainted. 
1 The Regulation of Electricity Lines Businesses 
The new provisions for electricity lines businesses serve to shortcut the process 
so that an Order in Council on the recommendation of the Minister is not 
required to declare that goods or services provided by them are 'controlled' for 
the purposes of the Act. Instead such a declaration may be made by the 
Commerce Commission. These declarations are subject to a raft of procedural 
requirements including the establishment of thresholds for the declaration of 
control. Industry and consumer consultation is required and must be given 
regard to, 11
8 and it is questionable therefore whether there are any real 
streamlining gains over the old process. Section 570 of the Act states that the 
pricing methodologies of Transpower, who own and operate New Zealand's 
national grid for electricity transmission, may need Commerce Commission 
authorisation. This will, however, only occur in the event that it is required by 
Order in Council, so again little real change from the previous price control 
provisions is evident. 
2 The Telecommunications Act 2001 
The new telecommunications regime heralded by the Telecommunications Act 
2001 could also be criticised for bringing little significant change. While a 
Telecommunications Commissioner has been appointed to oversee the industry 
and make determinations on such issues as the contribution to universal service 
obligations and network access and the terms thereof, the Act still gives primacy 
to commercial negotiations in access disputes. The commissioner may make a 
determination on a dispute where the negotiations fail. The potential for 
protracted access disputes still exists, what appears to have changed is that an 
arbiter more qualified in the industry than the courts will now make the 
determinations. Schedule 2 of the Act also provides for self regulation by a 
forum comprised of representatives from firms in the industry. This forum is 
able to prepare telecommunication access codes in relation to designated and 
specified services. The wisdom of having the telecommunications industry 
regulate itself is questionable and given the difficulties already faced in agreeing 
the composition of the forum itself,
119 it appears that the problems of the light-
handed regime have simply been supplanted by new time-consuming problems. 
3 Diluting the Commerce Act? 
The reliance on specific regulation to deal with problematic industries provides 
a concerning precedent however. In so doing government has given a signal that 
11 8 see Commerce Act ss 57G( I) , 571( I) regarding thresholds for declaration of control and 
process before declaration made respectively. 
11 9 "Telecomms Fomm Stymied" (18 Febrary 2002) NZ lnfotech Weekly Wellinton I. 
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should similar problems in other industries anse under a prov1s1on that is 
essentially the same as that which failed telecommunications and electricity, 
these may be dealt with by further industry-specific regulation. 
The imposition of industry-specific regulation on telecommunications and 
electricity lines may well have taken some of the wind out of the Government's 
sails in relation to the generic prohibition on the misuse of market power. 
Whatever the merits of the regulation itself, Labour could be seen by voters to 
have delivered on its promises. The Alliance, though unsuccessful in obtaining 
the return of ECNZ to full State ownership, could be satisfied that the regulation 
of Telecom it had demanded had been achieved. Having introduced new rules 
for governing telecommunications in particular, there may have been a belief 
that there would now be few industries in which the misuse of market power 
provisions would raise issues of great concern to the economy and the public. 
Aware that telecommunications and electricity lines were going to be separately 
regulated, it is questionable then whether the Government needed to bring about 
any changes to section 36 at all. It might also be argued that the reforms were 
calculated not to bring about any substantive change, and were simply a tool to 
display the Government's intent to harmonise our business laws with those of 
Australia and show itself to be honouring its pledges. 
XI WHO DARES WIN? 
Given the lack of significant change brought about by the Commerce 
Amendment Act 2001, it is difficult to say whether anybody can feel truly 
satisfied with the state of New Zealand's prohibition on the misuse of market 
power following the amendments. 
While big business will no doubt be pleased that an effects test that would have 
placed larger constraints on their activities was not introduced, the very fact that 
other changes have been made to section 36 means that larger businesses in 
general face increased compliance costs. The lack of certainty afforded by the 
amendments also suggests that larger firms will be more risk averse in their 
competitive strategies for fear of breaching section 36 and attracting a much 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
53 
larger penalty than the previous legislation provided for. The stated desire for 
efficiency to be given express recognition in the purpose statement of the Act
120 
was also unfulfilled. 
Small businesses on the other hand have even less to be grateful for. The 
prohibition is still rooted in the purpose of the fim1 holding market power rather 
than the effect of their conduct on competition. While the pre-eminence of the 
Privy Council's use test has been undermined somewhat, the Melway and 
Carter Holt decisions suggest that dominant fim1s will still be availed of 
excuses for acts that impact negatively on the ability of smaller firms to 
compete. Without explicit recognition in the Act, in either the purpose statement 
or in section 36, the interests of small business have been largely ignored. 
Consumers may feel that following the amendments they are better off as the 
Act is now intended to promote competition for their long term benefit. But the 
scheme and purpose of the Commerce Act has not changed in any significant 
way. The consumer benefit referred to in the purpose statement seems 
intrinsically tied up benefits derived from dynamic efficiency, and does not take 
in other notions such as choice of suppliers, income redistribution, and other 
populist notions such as the support of local and independent producers. 
XII CONCLUSION 
It appears then that an almost blind devotion to harmonisation, a penchant for 
keeping pledges, the ambush of the High Court of Australia' s decision in 
Me/way, the introduction of specific legislation for the electricity and 
telecommunications industries, and a seeming unwillingness to address 
specifically the function of our generic competition laws and introduce 
legislation unique to New Zealand, have conspired to render the reforms to 
section 36 a costly exercise in window dressing at best. The strengthening of the 
Commerce Act so audibly heralded has simply not happened, indeed with the 
120 See New Zealand Business Roundtable "Submiss ion to the Commerce Committee on the 
Commerce Amendment Bill 1999" 2. 
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increasing reliance upon sector-specific regulation a strong case can be made 
that the Act has diminished in importance. 
Balancing the social and economic aspirations of competition law is a difficult 
task for a government, and one that the Labour-Alliance Government may have 
found too difficult to stick their neck out either way on. The conflict between 
promoting economic growth and delivery on social policy outcomes must have 
weighed heavy on a centre-left government eager to curry economic credibility. 
However these aspects of the 2001 refom1s passed with barely a mention in our 
newspapers and certainly without any in-depth analysis of the options for 
reform that the differing perspectives might bring. The non-economic goals of 
the protection and preservation of the independence of smaller, locally owned 
business were largely ignored. The Alliance, the minority partner, were the only 
political party that appeared truly concerned with the interests of small business 
in their pre-election rhetoric, and with the Alliance's recent fall from power, it is 
questionable whether there is in fact anybody left in their comer. Consumer 
welfare was given lip service, but in the fonn of an ill-defined purpose 
statement which seems to measure benefits in purely economic terms. Economic 
considerations, particularly those of efficiency, remain unchallenged as the 
prime drivers of our competition laws. 
The Commerce Amendment Act marked an opportunity for an incoming 
government to revisit New Zealand's laws on the misuse of market power at a 
time of heightened frustration with the current regime. Instead the 2001 reforms 
ushered into place a prohibition with little distinguish it from its oft-criticised 
predecessor, or that proposed by the previous National Government, and basing 
it on an Australian provision that itself has faced regular calls for review. The 
reluctance to tackle directly the issues surrounding the policing of misuses of 
market power in the New Zealand economy suggests that the Government may 
have put this whole area of competition law in the too-hard basket, or rather, 
placed problematic industries in the hands of regulators and given the 
unenviable task of detem1ining the fundamental purpose of our misuse of 
market prohibition to the courts, as and when section 36 cases arise. 
~Wccb!~~fti~~ 
Regulations is charged on 
Overdue Books. 
1ij/ili~ii/jlf lliill I 1iii 
3 7212 00692883 0 
VICTORIA 
UNIVERSITY 
OF 
WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
B276 
2002 
AS741 
vuw 
A66 
B276 
2002 

